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Abstract We discuss the principles for a primitive, object-linguistic notion of conse-
quence proposed by (Beall and Murzi, Journal of Philosophy, 3 pp. 143–65 (2013))
that yield a version of Curry’s paradox. We propose and study several strategies
to weaken these principles and overcome paradox: all these strategies are based on
the intuition that the object-linguistic consequence predicate internalizes whichever
meta-linguistic notion of consequence we accept in the first place. To these solu-
tions will correspond different conceptions of consequence. In one possible reading
of these principles, they give rise to a notion of logical consequence: we study the
corresponding theory of validity (and some of its variants) by showing that it is con-
servative over a wide range of base theories: this result is achieved via a well-behaved
form of local reduction. The theory of logical consequence is based on a restriction
of the introduction rule for the consequence predicate. To unrestrictedly maintain this
principle, we develop a conception of object-linguistic consequence, which we call
grounded consequence, that displays a restriction of the structural rule of reflexivity.
This construction is obtained by generalizing Saul Kripke’s inductive theory of truth
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(strong Kleene version). Grounded validity will be shown to satisfy several desirable
principles for a naı¨ve, self-applicable notion of consequence.
Keywords Object-linguistic consequence · V-Curry paradox · Logical consequence ·
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1 Introduction
Object-linguistic treatments of consequence have been extensively investigated in the
recent literature: on these approaches, consequence is formalized as a predicate in
some first-order language, and principles governing its behaviour are given. These
studies are motivated by diverse philosophical aims, ranging from criticisms to para-
consistent theories [39], to deflationism about consequence [34], to new versions
of truth-theoretical paradoxes such as Curry’s paradox [1, 18, 27]. Some of these
authors, Beall and Murzi [1] and Murzi and Shapiro [23] in particular, also stress
the analogy between object-linguistic treatments of consequence, truth, and com-
prehension, and call for a unified solution of the resulting paradoxes, arguing that
substructural approaches are preferable to fully structural ones.1 In order to con-
form with the terminology adopted in the literature, we will treat ‘consequence’ and
‘validity’ as synonymous where, crucially, consequence or validity do not necessarily
coincide with logical consequence or logical validity.
All these approaches can in fact be seen as investigating different ways in which
some conclusion ‘follows from’ some premises. In their recent [1], Beall and Murzi
proposed the following naı¨ve principles for a primitive validity predicate Val(x, y):
where ϕ and ψ range over sentences possibly containing Val itself, and · is infor-
mally understood as a name-forming device. It is not completely clear how to read  :
Beall and Murzi [1] interpret it as an unspecified relation of ‘following from’. They
also introduce (what they see as) an analogue of the disquotation schema for truth:
(VP) and (VD) are inconsistent with classical logic, over a sufficiently expressive
base theory. Beall and Murzi show this via a variant of Curry’s Paradox, which they
call V-Curry Paradox. In order to introduce the paradox, let us fix the meaning of 
as a sequent arrow of a system including (VD) and the axioms of a sufficiently strong
syntax theory as initial sequents, and closed under (VP) and the standard logical rules
– notably, left contraction and cut. Our syntactic axioms enable us to find a sentence ν
1To emphasize even more the analogy with truth, we note that an object-linguistic predicate for conse-
quence is needed for the same purposes that motivate a truth predicate, such as blind ascriptions (‘all the
derivations made this morning in the Logic lecture are valid’) or generalizations.
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that is inter-derivable with Val(ν, ⊥), where ⊥ is some falsity of the base theory.
Reasoning in the naı¨ve theory of validity, we have:
In this paper, we explore different strategies to block the V-Curry and related
paradoxes. These strategies fall under a common intuition: starting with some
meta-theoretic consequence relations, we internalize them in the object language
in ways that capture their fundamental traits. That is, each such strategy corre-
sponds to the acceptance of different principles for Val and to different restrictions
of the structural rules. Different solutions to the paradox, then, correspond to dif-
ferent ways of cashing out the idea that the acceptance of a sentence of the form
Val(ϕ, ψ) is ultimately to be explained and justified by the acceptance of some
meta-theoretical validity statements, where the acceptance of the latter does not
involve object-linguistic validity principles.
A natural option to develop this strategy, and block the V-Curry (and related para-
doxes), is to apply (VP) only to logical derivations. Under this reading, Val becomes a
primitive predicate for logical validity. This is the strategy followed by Ketland [15]:
he axiomatizes Val over Peano Arithmetic (henceforth PA) and proves the consistency
of the theory resulting from this restriction of (VP). This option is supported by the
fact that (VP) does not preserve logical validity. The very possibility of formulating
(VP) requires a well-behaved machinery to handle the name-forming device · and
this machinery does not satisfy uniform substitutivity, violating a basic requirement
for logically valid principles.2
However, Ketland’s consistency proof only applies to a restricted category of
theories. These theories will be called later reflexive theories. Moreover, Ketland’s
strategy is based on the possibility of reducing the primitive logical validity predi-
cate to a provability predicate definable in PA. Besides establishing consistency, such
proof-theoretic reductions (such as conservativity and variants of interpretability)
also help us in characterizing the notion associated with the logical validity pred-
icate. For instance, the reducibility of the truth predicate to the base theory may
be used to assess general conceptions of truth such as truth-theoretical deflationism
(see [14, Ch. 7]): in the same way, proof-theoretical reductions might be employed
to assess deflationary and other general conceptions of logical validity (see [34]).
Therefore, in Section 2, we provide more general reduction techniques that, besides
yielding a consistency proof, will give us a finer-grained analysis of logical validity
axiomatized over a wide range of base theories.3
2Suppose in fact that (VP) is logically valid, that there is a logical derivation of ϕ  ψ , and that f is
a function in the language from names of sentences to terms that do not name sentences. Then applying
(VP) and uniform substitutivity we conclude that Val(f (ϕ), f (ψ)) comes out as logically derivable,
which is absurd. This is clearly remarked in [7].
3Ketland’s results will turn out to be special cases of our findings.
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A noteworthy feature of object-linguistic logical validity is that iterations of the
validity predicate are not allowed. For if ϕ  ψ is logically valid we can conclude
Val(ϕ, ψ) in the theory of logical validity, but from the latter we cannot conclude
Val(∅, Val(ϕ, ψ)). There are, however, different notions of consequence,
and notions expressing ‘following from’ more generally, for which iterations are
very natural, such as entailment or implication.4 A standard option to approximate
iterability is resorting to hierarchies, namely stratifying the  and the validity pred-
icate. For example, Field [9] suggests a hierarchy of validity predicates and sequent
arrows, and the following version of Beall and Murzi’s principles, where β is read
as ‘derivability in the theory of validity of level β’:
In Section 2.4 we will see that this stratified notion of validity may be understood
in terms of a hierarchy of reflection principles over the starting theory: therefore, not
only stratified object-linguistic validity is classically consistent, but it has a natural
conceptual analysis in terms of a hierarchy of soundness extensions of the starting
theory.
However, like any hierarchical approach, also this proposal suffers from variants
of the so-called ‘Nixon-Dean problem’ (see [16], pp. 694–697); consider for example
the following case
Speaker A says: ‘the negation of everything I say follows from what Speaker B
says’.
Speaker B says: ‘everything I say follows from what Speaker A says’.
As for truth, these cases pose problems for hierarchical and non-self-applicable
accounts of consequence.
In Sections 3–4, we develop an approach to object-linguistic validity that over-
comes this problem: it blocks paradoxical arguments and, at the same time, avoids
restrictions on (VP), recovers a natural version of (VD), and delivers a single and gen-
uinely self-applicable notion of validity. This will be accomplished by an inductive
construction that generalizes the one in [16] (strong Kleene version). The fundamen-
tal feature of the construction is that the models (for languages with self-applicable
validity) it generates do not satisfy the structural rule of reflexivity.5 The smallest
fixed point of our construction yields a notion that we might call grounded valid-
ity, in that it extends Kripke’s notion of grounded truth (see [16], pp. 694 and
706–707). This is because the meta-theoretical notion of validity that holds in the
base language determines the extension of the object-linguistic validity predicate. As
we argue in Section 5, grounded validity affords us a natural reading of the naı¨ve
validity-theoretical principles.
4See [28].
5For a quirk of terminology, ‘reflexive’ will be employed in two different senses: (i) as referred to arith-
metical systems that prove the consistency of all their finite subsystems, and (ii) as referred to theories that
satisfy the structural rule of reflexivity. We apologize for the possible, but unavoidable, confusion.
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2 Object-Linguistic Validity and Classical Logic
One may be tempted to read the rules (VP) and (VD) as characterizing a notion of
logical validity or logical consequence. However, it became soon clear that this temp-
tation should be resisted: object-linguistic treatments of logical consequence simply
do not give rise to paradox. This is the conclusion reached by Cook [7] and Ketland
[15], and echoed by Field [9]. In particular, the former analyze the Curry-like deriva-
tion sketched in the introduction and come to the main conclusion that paradox
arises when the principles governing this notion (whatever it may be) of primitive
consequence are themselves considered to be logically valid.6
In the following two subsections we consider strategies to overcome paradox
while keeping classical logic. But we do not only aim at (classical) consistency: by
considering suitable reduction methods of the theories with primitive validity to the
respective base theory or suitable extensions of it, we intend to study the nature of
the concept of validity in relation with the inferential resources of the starting base
theory. In particular:
1. Improving on [7, 15], we give a uniform method for the conservativity of
the theories of logical validity over an arbitrary theory extending Elementary
Arithmetic (EA), a very weak arithmetical theory.
2. This method will also yield the reducibility of the theory of logical validity to
reflexive base theories (e.g. PA as in [7, 15]) and its local reducibility in finitely
axiomatized based theories (e.g. EA itself), in which ‘reduction’ is intended
as a well-behaved version of relative interpretability that preserves arithmetical
vocabulary.
3. Even if logical validity is extended to purely arithmetical consequence, classical
logic can consistently be kept by interpreting Val as provability in the base theory.
Starting form this observation, we show that the hierarchy of validity predicates
hinted at by Field [9] can be naturally interpreted as a hierarchy of local reflection
principles for the starting theory.
These formal results suggest in turn that the notions of primitive logical and arith-
metical (or syntactic) validity are not only unparadoxical, but that they can be
conceptually reduced, either globally or locally, to notions definable in the base
theory or extensions in the same language.
6It is also clear that the paradox can be derived by avoiding any syntactic/arithmetical assumption. To see
this, one can employ a familiar trick due to Montague [21]. A finite formulation of the axioms of a finitely
axiomatizable T (see below for the choice of T ) can be pushed into the instance of the diagonal lemma
needed in the derivation of the paradox. Starting with the instance
ν ↔ Val(ν ∧ A,⊥)
of the diagonal lemma, where A is a finite reaxiomatization of T , one easily obtains a version of the
paradox that does not rely on the assumption of the logical validity of the underlying arithmetical theory
but only of the principles for logical consequence.
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2.1 Arithmetical Theories and Reductions
We now fix some formal details. We work in the language L = {0,S,+,×, exp,
≤} of arithmetic. Occurrences of the quantifiers in expressions of the form (∀x ≤
t) ϕ(x) and (∃x ≤ t) ϕ(x) where t does not contain x are called bounded. Formulas
containing only bounded occurrences of quantifiers are called elementary formulas
or 0-formulas.
All theories considered below will extend Elementary Arithmetic EA (or, equiva-
lently, I0 plus the totality of exponentiation).7
The class of elementary functions E is obtained by closing the initial functions
zero(·), suc(·), +, ×, 2x , Pni (x1, ..., xn) = xi with (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and truncated
subtraction x−˙y under the operations of composition and bounded minimalization:
H(x)=F(G1(x), . . . ,Gn(x)); (μt ≤ y) P (x, t)=
{
the least t ≤ y s.t. P(x, t)
0, if there is no such t
where F,G1, . . . ,Gn are elementary functions and P an elementary predicate. EA
has sufficient resources to naturally introduce new relations corresponding to the
elementary functions by proving their defining equations. We will therefore freely
employ some functional expressions for the relevant elementary operations and
relations.
The formalization of the syntax of first-order theories as it is standardly done in,
e.g., [33], is carried out without difficulties in EA. In particular, once we show that
the standard arithmetization of the syntax can be captured by elementary functions,
the fact that EA can 1-define precisely the elementary functions ensures us that
syntactic predicates and notions can be intensionally captured in it.
Unless otherwise specified, throughout this section we fix a Hilbert-style system
for first-order logic in which modus ponens is the only rule of inference: X  ϕ then
indicates that there is a derivation in this system of ϕ from sentences in X, logical
axioms, and using modus ponens only. Derivations will therefore be sequences of for-
mulas. Also the syntactic notion of relative interpretation of a theory U presented via
an elementary set of axioms into another elementary presented theory W will repeat-
edly occur:8 it can be considered as a triple (U, τ,W), with τ a translation function
7For more details on EA and elementary functions the reader may consult [3, 33]. The axioms of EA are
the universal closures of the following:
EA1 0 	= Sx
EA2 Sx = Sy → x = y
EA3 x + 0 = x
EA4 x + Sy = S(x + y)
EA5 x × 0 = 0
EA6 x × Sy = (x × y) + x
EA7 exp(0) = 1
EA8 exp(Sx) = exp(x) + exp(x)
EA9 x ≤ 0 ↔ x = 0
EA10 x ≤ Sy ↔ (x ≤ y ∨ x = Sy)
In addition, EA features the principle of induction for elementary formulas ϕ(x):
8The notion of relative interpretation goes back to Tarski et al. [36]. Although it is a syntactic notion, it has
a natural semantic counterpart: if U is interpretable in W , in any model of W we can construct an internal
model of U .
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τ : LU → LW that maps n-ary relations of LU into LW -formulas with n free vari-
ables, n-ary functions of LU into LW -formulas with n + 1 free variables satisfying
the obvious existence and uniqueness conditions, and that relativizes quantifiers to
a suitable LW -formula δ(x), the domain of the translation. In addition, (U, τ,W)
satisfies
if U  ϕ, then W 
∧
xi∈FV(ϕ)
δ(xi) → ϕτ
for formulas ϕ ∈ LU and FV(ϕ) the set of free variables of ϕ.
A relative interpretation preserves the structure of a proof. On many occasions we
will employ a more regimented notion of relative interpretation. An interpretation is
direct if quantifiers are unrelativized and identity is mapped into identity. Let U and
W be such that L ⊆ LU ∩ LW . We say that U is L -embeddable in W if there
is a direct interpretation of U into W that leaves the L -vocabulary unchanged. L -
embedding is a properly stricter notion than relative interpretability.9 Finally, U is
locally interpretable in W if any finite subtheory of U is relatively interpretable in
W . The notion of local L -embedding is defined analogously.
2.2 Object-Linguistic Logical Validity
As anticipated, in this subsection we deal with object-linguistic treatments of logical
validity: that is we focus on theories that will be obtained by restricting (VP) only
to purely logical derivations. It is worth remarking here that, since we are employ-
ing classical logic, the deduction theorem holds: this makes the presentation of the
theories of logical validity smoother.
Definition 1 Let T ⊇ EA be a consistent theory formulated in LV = L ∪ {Val}.
The theory T V0 extends T with the following principles, for all LV -sentences ϕ,ψ :
We refer to the theory T V0 as the theory obtained from T V0 by allowing only
formulas of L as instances of nonlogical axiom schemata of T .
T V0 results from restricting (VP) to purely logical derivations. However, since
conditional introduction will be assumed throughout this section, it is convenient to
work with a unary rather than a binary validity predicate.
9Feferman’s theorem on the interpretability of inconsistency (see [38]) represents a separating exam-
ple between relative interpretation and L -embeddings. Let T be ω-consistent: by Feferman’s theorem,
T + ¬Con(T ) is interpretable in T , but it cannot be L -embeddable in T because L -embeddability
clearly preserves ω-inconsistency. For a study of how to separate L -embeddings from stronger notions of
equivalence, see [26].
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Definition 2 (Primitive logical validity) Let T ⊇ EA be a consistent theory formu-
lated in L + = L ∪ {V}, where V is now intended as a unary predicate. The theory
T V extends T with the principles, for all L +-sentences ϕ:
Again we refer to the theory T V as the theory obtained from T V by allowing only
formulas of L as instances of nonlogical axiom schemata of T .
That T V is no essential modification of T V0 is guaranteed by the following:
Proposition 1 T V and T V0 are mutually L -embeddable, and so are T V and T V0.
Proof The idea is entirely straightforward. By employing the recursion theorem
to translate within Go¨del quotes,10 we can uniformly replace Val(x, y) and V(x)
with, respectively, V(τ0(x →· y)) and Val(0 = 0, τ1(x)) where τ0, τ1 are suit-
able (elementary) translations that leave the arithmetical vocabulary unchanged and
do not relativize quantifiers. The verification that the two translations are in fact
L -embeddings is routine as the following holds, for i ≤ 1 and ϕ either in L + or in
LV :
(5) if ϕ is provable in pure logic, then so is ϕτi
It is intuitively fairly clear that the derivation of the V-Curry paradox is blocked in
T V. When (VP) is applied in the informal presentation of the paradox on p. 2, (VD)
has been already employed and therefore (VP), in the step between (3) and (4), cannot
be applied, since the sequent in (3) is not obtained via a purely logical derivation.
This indicates a strategy to prove the consistency of T V, which anticipates some traits
of the construction carried out in Section 3.2. The following is a positive inductive
definition of the set S of logical truths of L +:
(6) y ∈ S ↔ SentL +(y) ∧
(
LAx(y) ∨ ∃x (x ∈ S ∧ (x →· y) ∈ S)
)
where SentL + and LAx are elementary predicates representing the set of (codes of)
sentences of L + and of logical axioms respectively. A fixed point of this definition
is a set X such that (N, X) models (6) in the sense that X is taken as the extension of
S. It is easy to see that the least such fixed point IV is reached after ω iterations of the
operator associated with (6) and that the structure (N, IV ) is a model of T V (and T V).
However, consistency may be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for
a full characterization of the concept of validity captured by T V. As we mentioned
above, a primitive validity predicate is usually motivated – for instance in [1, 23,
34] – along similar lines as the truth predicate: in both cases we aim at expressing
meta-theoretic facts in the object-language. For instance, one might want to prove
10We refer to [13, Section 5.3] for motivation and to [33, Section 2.6.1] for a proof of the theorem in EA.
Principles for Object-Linguistic Consequence
in T V that all tautologies are logically valid, or that so are all implications from a
finite subsets of the axioms of T V. A natural question concerns therefore the costs of
the extra expressive power given by V with respect to the inferential resources of the
base theory. Moreover, it is mathematically interesting to weigh these costs across
a wide range of possible syntactic base theories by abstracting away from specific
conditions related to a particular choice of the base theory. From this point of view,
a general study of the properties of the theory of object-linguistic validity such as
its L -embedding in the base theory T , conservativity over T , finite axiomatizability
over T , become integral part of the study of this notion of validity.
The analogy with truth cannot be pushed much further; in particular, it would
be a mistake to see theories of logical validity as a subspecies of theories of truth.
Theories of truth featuring the truth-theoretic version of (VD1) are usually prone to
an asymmetry between the internal theory – i.e. what the theory proves true – and the
set of its theorems: they prove the conjunction λ∧¬Tλ for some sentence λ, where
T is the truth predicate. In other words, the theory displays the puzzling feature of
asserting a sentence while declaring it untrue.11 The situation in T V is both similar
and radically different. By diagonalization, we can obviously obtain a sentence χ
such that
(7) T V  χ ↔ ¬V(χ)
By (VD1) and (7), we can derive ¬V(χ) and therefore χ in T V. However, if V is
interpreted as logical validity, it is not only harmless, but even desirable for χ to be
derivable in T V but not logically valid because its derivation crucially involves (VD1).
Next we show that the primitive notion of consequence given by T V cannot serve
an expressive role of finite re-axiomatization.12
Lemma 1 T V is not finitely axiomatizable.
Proof Seeking a contradiction, let T0 be finite reaxiomatization of T V such that
T0  T V. This entails that we can find a finite subtheory A of T V such that A  T V
and in which (VP1) and (VD1) can only be applied to sentences of L + containing at
most n logical symbols. Let L +n be this latter set of sentences. Now adapt (6) in the
following way, where SentL +n is the set of (codes of) sentences of L
+ containing at
most n occurrences of logical symbols:
k ∈ S ↔ k = ¬( ∧ . . . ∧ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∧ applied n-times
) ∨
[
k∈SentL +n ∧
(
LAx(k)∨∃m(m ∈ SentL +n ∧m ∈ S∧(m→· k)∈S)
)]
Let IV n be the least fixed point of this inductive definition. (N, IV n) is a model of
A but it cannot be a model of T V.
11This is the standard objection against classical theories such as a version of the well-known theory
Kripke-Feferman KF. See [8, 13].
12The same proof applies to T V.
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We now move on to the question of the conservativity and L -embeddability of
T V in T . In what follows, we distinguish between reflexive and finitely axiomatizable
extensions of EA. We recall that a theory is reflexive if it proves the consistency of
any of its finite subtheories: for all natural choices of T , reflexive theories T prove,
for finite S ⊂ T and for all ϕ ∈ L ,
(Rfn(S)) PrS(ϕ) → ϕ
where PrS(·) is a canonical provability predicate for S.
For reflexive T , the question of the L -embedding and conservativity of T V in T
is readily obtained: let us define the elementary translation a : L + → L :
(s = t)a := s = t (Vt)a := Pr∅(a(t))
(¬ϕ)a := ¬ϕa (ϕ ∧ ψ)a := ϕa ∧ ψa
(∀xϕ)a := ∀xϕa
The definition of a again relies on Kleene’s recursion theorem: in particular a(·)
represents (·)a in EA; moreover, Pr∅(·) stands for canonical logical provability, that
is provability from the empty set of nonlogical assumptions.
Lemma 2
(i) If T is reflexive, then a is an L -embedding of T V in T .
(ii) If T is finitely axiomatizable, a cannot be an interpretation of T V in T .
Proof Both proofs are immediate. For (i), one simply notices that T , being reflexive,
proves Pr∅(ϕ) → ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L by Rfn(S).
For (ii), if a were an interpretation of T V in T , by letting A be again a finite
axiomatization of T , we would have
A  PrA(⊥) → ⊥,
(with ⊥ := 0 = 1), which contradicts Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem.
Part (i) of the previous lemma obviously entails the interpretability of T V in T for
reflexive T , being L -embeddings stricter than intepretability. Two further remarks:
the interpretation a is a variant of the one contained in [15], which only takes care of
external occurrences of V without applications of the recursion theorem. Moreover,
in Lemma 2(i), a is indeed an L -embedding of T V in T when the latter is reflexive.
This clearly indicates that, in the case of reflexive theories, the notion of validity
governed by (VP1) and (VD1) can be unequivocally understood as a definable notion
of logical validity. Lemma 2(i) also immediately yields the conservativity of T V over
T for reflexive T .
However reflexive theories are in many senses very special and they have a pecu-
liar behaviour with respect to interpretability and related notions. For instance, by
Orey’s compactness theorem,13 reflexive theories collapse the distinction between
13The theorem states that if V is reflexive and any finite U0 ⊆ U is interpretable in V , also U is
interpretable in V (see [12, Secton 3]).
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local and global interpretability and they have the very convenient feature of proving
the reflection principle for pure logic that is, as we have seen, closely related to (VD1).
It is therefore natural to generalize the picture given by Lemma 2 and ask ourselves
whether the notion of consequence captured by (VP1) and (VD1) can be uniformly
characterized also in the case of non-reflexive theories. As we anticipated, we will
focus on finitely axiomatized theories, which are provably distinct from reflexive
theories due to Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem.
We recall that U is locally interpretable in V if every finite subtheory of U is
interpretable in V . Similarly, U is locally L -embeddable in V if every finite U0 ⊆
U is L -embeddable in V . We also recall that T V is formulated in a Hilbert-style
calculus in which modus ponens is the only rule of inference. Proofs in T V of ϕ
are therefore objects of the form D = 〈ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1, ϕ〉 where each element of the
sequence is either an axiom of T V or it has been obtained from previous elements by
modus ponens. Also, the code |D | of D is the code of 〈ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1〉.
To prove the local L -embeddability of T V in T , we need the following, well
known fact:
Lemma 3 (1-completeness) For every 1-formula ϕ of L and every T extending
EA, if N  ϕ, then T  ϕ.
The informal idea for the proof of the local L -embeddability of T V in T is
straightforward: we translate only the outermost occurrences of V because only one
‘layer’ of the logical validity predicate matters in logical proofs. This enables us to
dispense with uses of more sophisticated devices, such as the recursion theorem, to
translate within Go¨del corners.
Proposition 2 T V is locally L -embeddable in T .
Proof Let B be a finite subsystem of T V. In B, we can safely assume that there are
at most m applications of (VP1) to logical proofs Di , i ≤ m.
Let |Di | ≤ n for all logical proofs Di , that is, the code of each such Di is smaller
or equal than n. By our assumptions on sequence coding (see [33, Section 2.2]),
bounds for (codes of) sequences and their concatenations are given by
〈k, . . . , k〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
m-times
≤ (k + 1)2m; s0 s1 ≤ (s0 + s1)2
2lh(s0)
.
where lh(·) is the elementary function that outputs the number of the elements of a
sequence.
We define an elementary predicate Vn(x) stating that x is proved in predicate logic
with a proof whose code is less than n:
Vn(x) :↔ (∃y  n) (Prf∅(y, x))
Here Prf∅(·, ·) is elementary and expresses Hilbert-style provability in PL(L +),
predicate logic in the language L +. This n is fixed and will be kept so throughout
the proof.
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We specify the translation b: it is important to notice that here we are not
employing the recursion theorem.
(s = t)b := s = t (Vx)b := Vn(x)
·b commutes with prop. connectives (∀xϕ)b := ∀xϕb
To verify that b is an L -embedding, we check that (VP1) and (VD1) hold modulo the
translation. More generally, we show by induction on the length of the derivation in
B that, for all L +-sentences ϕ,
(8) if B  ϕ, then T  ϕb
It is clear that we obtain (8) when ϕ is a logical or arithmetical axiom of B. Let ϕ be
of the form V(ψ) → ψ . Obviously we have
either N |= Vn(ψ) or N |= ¬Vn(ψ).
If the latter, then we are done by Lemma 3 because Vn is elementary. If the former
disjunct obtains, there is a purely logical derivation Dj of ψ such that |Dj | ≤ n. Then
there is a purely logical derivation Dbj of ψ
b obtained by translating its elements.14
For the induction step, we only need to worry about (VP1). Now if ϕ is obtained
by an application of (VP1), it has the form V(ψ) for ψ an L +-sentence and there
is a purely logical proof Di of ψ . By assumption, |Di | ≤ n, therefore T  Vn(ψ)
by Lemma 3.
Now Proposition 2 immediately yields, besides the consistency of T V that wasn’t
seriously doubted, the conservativity of T V over T for any T extending EA.
Corollary 1 T V is a conservative extension of T .
Proof If T V  ϕ and ϕ ∈ L , then already a finite subsystem B ⊂ T V proves ϕ. By
Proposition 2, T  ϕb. But ϕb is nothing more than ϕ itself by definition of b.
The conservativity of T V over T immediately yields the consistency of T V, relative
to the consistency of T , that was assumed in Definition 2. It should be noted that the
conservativity of T V can be obtained in a straightforward way since any model M
of T ⊇ EA can be expanded to a model (M , S) of T V where S is the set specified in
the inductive definition (6). It is not clear to us whether this strategy can be adapted
to the full T V. The strategy employed in Proposition 2, however, has the additional
advantage of being formalizable with only weak arithmetical assumptions.
Moreover, we obtain another proof of the interpretability of T V in T , for T
reflexive, by Orey’s compactness theorem:
Corollary 2 For T ⊇ EA and reflexive, T V is interpretable in T .
14By employing the sequence encoding sketched above, one can estimate for the translated proof: |Dbj | ≤
G(n), where
G(n) = 〈n(n + 1)2n , . . . , n(n + 1)2n 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-times
=
(
n(n + 1)2n + 1
)2(n(n+1)2n )
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As far as the authors know, the question of the global interpretability of T V for
arbitrary T ⊇ EA is still open.
2.3 Extending Logical Consequence
It seems natural to wonder whether the reduction methods considered in the pre-
vious section can be tweaked to satisfy more principles for V. As noticed already
by Ketland, the L -embedding a, without essential modifications, gives us a more
substantial theory of logical consequence over reflexive theories encompassing
principles such as the following ones:
(K) V(ϕ → ψ) ∧ V(ϕ) → V(ψ)
(9) ¬V(V(ϕ))
The consistency of the theory T V+K+9 is guaranteed by the following corollary to
Lemma 2:
Observation 1 The theory T V+K+9 is L -embeddable in and conservative over T
for reflexive T ⊇ EA.
Let’s abbreviate T V+K by writing T V+ . Can we obtain analogues of Proposition 2
and Corollary 1 for T V
+
over arbitrary T ⊇ EA? It turns out that we can, by suitably
tweaking the proofs given above.15 The fundamental idea is to modify the bound
given in the definition of Vn in Proposition 2 to allow for the concatenation of the log-
ical proofs of formulas ϕ and ϕ → ψ of L + when the translations of the antecedent
of K are assumed.
Proposition 3 T V
+
is locally L -embeddable in T .
Proof As before, let B be a finite subsystem of T V
+
. Again, we fix a standard n as
bound for the codes of the finitely many logical proofs Di preceding an application
of (VP1).
Let Cn(x) be equivalent to:
(∃y≤H(n)) (Prf∅(y, x) ∧ (∀i ≤ lh(y))(det((y)i, y) → tru(y, i) ≤ n ∧ (∃w ≤ n)
(Prf∅(w, (y)i))))
where
H(n) = 〈n, . . . , n〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2-times
 〈n, . . . , n〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2-times
=
(
2(n + 1)2n2
)22n2
det(x, y) is an elementary predicate expressing that x is an ‘only detachable’ mem-
ber of y, that is the proof only ‘cuts’ x via modus ponens and x is not a proper
15We adapt to the present setting a more general strategy suggested to us by Albert Visser.
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subformula of any other member of y; tru(x, y) is an elementary function that takes
the initial subsequence of x with y components and outputs its code.16 Intuitively,
Cn(x) expresses that x has a proof in pure logic that (i) applies modus ponens to
assumptions that are themselves logically provable with proofs smaller than n and
(ii) in which all subproofs of these assumptions are also smaller than n.
As before, we define the translation c that, like b, only replaces outer occurrences
of V in proofs, clearly this time with Cn and not Vn.
The proof now proceeds along similar lines as the proof of Proposition 2 except,
of course, for the case of K. In particular, we want to show, for an arbitrary ϕ ∈ L +,
(10) T  Cn(ϕ)∧Cn(ϕ → ψ) → Cn(ψ)
As before, if one of Cn(ϕ) and Cn(ϕ → ψ) are not true-in-N, we obtain the
claim by Lemma 3. If they are both true, then there are proofs D0 and D1 in PL(L +)
of ϕ and ϕ → ψ respecting the conditions above. Since the codes of the detach-
able members of both proofs will be smaller than n, and so is the number of their
subformulas, we can safely assume that
|Di | ≤ 〈n, . . . , n︸ ︷︷ ︸
n2-times
〉
for i ∈ {0, 1} and that there is a proof of ψ in PL(L +) with Go¨del number ≤ H(n).
Therefore N  Cn(ψ) and T  Cn(ψ) by Lemma 3.
By the same argument given in Corollary 1:
Corollary 3 T V
+
is a conservative extension of T .
Again, this guarantees the consistency of T V
+
relative to the consistency of T . As
above, Orey’s compactness theorem gives us:
Corollary 4 For T reflexive, T V
+
is interpretable in T .
The results just presented improve the picture discussed in [7, 15] and tell us that
in many respects – especially if one focuses on conservativity – primitive logical
validity is uniformly reducible to the resources of the base theory for a much wider
class of theories than the one considered before. However, we were not able to
show the interpretability, let alone the L -embedding, of T V and T V
+
in T . This is,
however, not an unexpected difficulty: by Orey’s and analogous results, there is no
gap between local and global interpretability in the context of reflexive theories such
as PA. In the case of finitely axiomatizable theories, by contrast, the relationships
between these two notions vary considerably and are usually hard to characterize.17
16In the definition of Cn, (x)y = z is an elementary functional expression corresponding to the projection
of the yth-element of x.
17For a study of the asymmetry between finitely axiomatized and reflexive theories in the context of
theories of truth, see [25].
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From the point of view of the theory of logical validity the lesson to learn is
apparent: the combination of (VP) and (VD) cannot be taken to characterize logical
validity, which is unparadoxical and uniformly conservative over base theories that
contain just a minimum amount of syntactic reasoning.
2.4 Arithmetical Consequence and Hierarchies
In the previous two subsections we analyzed primitive logical consequence based
on an introduction rule (VP1) for the primitive validity predicate restricted to purely
logical proofs. It turns out that no incisions on classical reasoning are needed even
if one liberalizes (VP1) to arithmetical consequence. We now show that by iterating
this idea to the transfinite we obtain a symmetry between the hierarchy of valid-
ity predicates suggested in [1, 9] and the hierarchy of local reflection principles for
a starting theory T . For the sake of determinateness, we assume our starting the-
ory to be EA, although the arguments would proceed in an analogous way for any
T ⊇ EA.
To define a hierarchy of primitive notions of validity, we assume a notation
(OR,≺) for ordinals up to 0, available in EA,18 and a countable stock of predicates
Va(x) – where a ranges over codes of ordinals α < 0, that is we take a Latin alpha-
bet letter to code the corresponding ordinal in the Greek alphabet. We let L0 to be
L itself and Lα+1 is Lα ∪ {Va}; Lλ, for λ limit, contains all Vb for β < λ.
Definition 3 (Hierarchical validity) Let S0 := EA. For successor ordinals, with
α < 0, Sα+1 in Lα is defined as follows:
(HL)
⋃
β<λ
Sβ for λ limit.
We briefly comment on the halting point 0: it is motivated by the availability
of natural notation systems and corresponding well-ordering proofs in the theories
Sα . Variations are obviously possible: notations for more ordinals are possible in EA,
although the details will bring us too far from our main concerns here. By contrast, if
one wants to stick with ordinals that are provably well-ordered in EA, one would need
to stop at ω3. We claim that this hierarchy of validity predicates is closely related to
the following, well-known hierarchy of local reflection principles over EA, again for
ordinals α, λ < 0:
R0 := EA; Rα+1 := Rα + Rfn(Rα); Rλ :=
⋃
β<λ
Rβ.
18In particular, OR is an elementary set of ordinal codes and ≺ an elementary relation isomorphic to the
usual well-ordering of ordinals up to 0.
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where
Rfn(T ) := PrT (ϕ) → ϕ for all ϕ ∈ LT .
The formalization of provability for the theories Rα can be carried out in a stan-
dard way once a notation for the ordinals and suitable well-ordering proofs are
available.
Proposition 4 For α < 0, Sα is L -embeddable in Rα .
Proof For each α < 0, we define a translation d : L<α → L as follows, for all
β < α, and where L<α := ⋃β<α Lβ :
(s = t)d := (s = t) (¬ϕ)d := ¬ϕd
(ϕ ∧ ψ)d := ϕd ∧ ψd (∀xϕ)d := ∀xϕd
(Vb(x))
d := PrRβ (d(x))
Now we argue inductively given that V0 = R0 and that limit stages are not prob-
lematic. For HS2α , if, in Rα+1, we have PrRα (d(ϕ)) for a standard ϕ, we can
conclude ϕd by applying the reflection principle of level α since SentL (dϕ), prov-
ably in EA. For HS1α , we can safely assume that Rα  ϕd. Therefore already in EA,
PrRα (d(ϕ)).
Proposition 4 suggests at least the following two remarks: for the reader interested
in the mathematical strength of the theories Sα , by a result of Beklemishev [2], these
theories will prove no more 1-arithmetical sentences than ωα iterated consistency
progressions over EA. At the philosophical level, the theories Sα embody a notion of
arithmetical validity corresponding to a proper extension of arithmetical provability
in the starting theory EA stratified along ordinal paths that are meaningful in the start-
ing theory. No incision on classical logic is needed at this stage. However, as pointed
out also in [9], the formulation of the theories Sα relies on how many ordinals we can
code in the starting theory. In order to read off a notion of validity from this stratified
picture there seem to be only two options: either validity is inherently stratified, or
there is a specific countable ordinal α such that Sα fulfills the requirements we are
willing to ascribe to the notion of validity. Neither of these alternatives, however, is
completely satisfactory; for one thing, there is no reason to think that validity should
be stratified, unless one is happy to concede that also truth is a stratified notion.
Moreover, the countable ordinals that are provably well-founded in arithmetical the-
ories vary considerably, and it is highly implausible that the notion of validity should
be tied to these implementation details.
This is not to say, however, that stratified validity lacks importance. Even if it
doesn’t afford a viable notion of validity, it gives us a tool to generate validities
starting from valid inferences in the base language. This picture will be improved
in the in the next two sections, where we will turn the hierarchical increase of
validities into a positive inductive definition. This technical shift will yield a truly
self-applicable notion of validity whose extension and properties are independent
of how we represent ordinals. As in the case of truth, this will require restricting
classical reasoning.
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3 A New Construction for Naı¨ve Validity
In this section we propose a way of transcending the stratified picture of validity
that generalizes Kripke’s method to provide models for languages with a self-
applicable truth predicate (see [16]). We will be mainly concerned with providing
a class of models that makes the naı¨ve principles for validity consistent, and not so
much with formulating effectively presented theories of validity (as in the previous
section).19 The models are obtained via fixed points of an inductive construction.
Similarly to what happens in Kripke’s theory of truth, we have only one validity
predicate that can be introduced without restrictions, via (VP). At a fixed point,
(VP) and all the principles that are accepted in the construction can be iterated
arbitrarily, thus internalizing all the inferences deriving from validities of the base
language.
3.1 Initial Sequents and Rules of Inferences
Since, in the perspective of an unstratified picture of validity, (VP) is not in question,
what are we do to with the V-Curry Paradox? We have seen in the introduction that
the paradox forces a restriction of contraction, cut, or (VD). The idea of transcending
the hierarchical conception of validity via an inductive definition is at odds with
(VD), even though it calls for an unrestricted acceptance of contraction and cut.20 For
sure, (VD) looks perfectly fine if we read Val as an unspecified ‘following from’ and
clearly also as the notion of logical validity studied in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, but things
are different if we accept (VP) unrestrictedly: in so doing, we take Val-statements to
represent a naı¨ve notion of consequence, namely meta-inferences that hold in virtue
of logical, base-theoretic, and validity-theoretic principles. However, in the presence
of full (VD), this idea translates into the acceptance of sentences that we might not
want to accept, such as ν.
In the perspective of transcending the hierarchy of validity predicates, one might
think that the problem with (VD) is that it allows us to conclude ψ on the assump-
tion that ϕ and Val(ϕ, ψ) hold. However, if the validity predicate represents
meta-theoretical inferences (possibly nested, due to its iterability), one might want to
employ an elimination rule that is based on Val-statements that are actually accepted,
rather than arbitrarily assumed. The following elimination rule for Val embodies this
intuition:
19It is nonetheless possible to develop axiomatic theories that are adequate for these models and therefore
avoid any arbitrariness in choosing a natural halting point for progressions of theories of stratified validity.
20Some substructural theories compatible with Beall and Murzi’s principles are available in the literature:
the non-contractive theory in [41] (see also [5]) and the non-transitive approach of [29] and [6] (see also
[37]) support both (VP) and (VD), and block the derivation of ⊥. Strictly speaking, these are theories of
naı¨ve truth that feature a conditional obeying conditional versions of (VP) and (VD), but they can be easily
adapted to naı¨ve validity.
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Adopting (VDm), however, is not sufficient to avoid the V-Curry Paradox in the
presence of reflexivity:
In fact, (Ref) and (VDm) together immediately yield (VD). So, a proof of ⊥ is now
easy to obtain via a modification of the V-Curry derivation given in the introduction,
using (Ref) and (VDm).
How can we avoid this new path to triviality? Our proposed solution consists in
the development of a Kripke-style positive inductive definition that, while restricting
(VD) and (Ref), consistently satisfies (VP), (VDm), contraction, cut, and indeed every
other classically valid rule of inference (with nonzero premises).21 More generally,
our construction will operate uniform restrictions on initial sequents: this harmonizes
with the motivation to restrict (VD) outlined above, since arbitrary initial sequents
might contain Val-sentences codifing problematic inferences. Rules of inference, by
contrast, are safe: if we can control the sequents that we accept, we can adopt all such
rules. A Kripke-style construction along the lines of the one developed here has been
hinted at by Field in [9]. Meadows [20] also develops an inductive construction that
recovers all Beall and Murzi’s principles. His construction also rejects reflexivity but,
unlike ours, it is not closed under contraction and cut.22
3.2 The KV-Construction
The generalization of Kripke’s construction we propose here consists in dealing with
sequents rather than single sentences. By ‘sequent’, from now on, we will mean an
object of the form  ⇒ , where  (the antecedent) and  (the consequent) are
finite sets of LV -sentences.
Let us describe our approach informally. The following definitions formalize the
intuition outlined above, by enabling us to:
– start with a set of sequents containing at least the ones the form  ⇒ , s0 = t0
and s1 = t1,  ⇒ , for s0 = t0 an atomic arithmetical truth, and s1 = t1 an
atomic arithmetical falsity,
– apply the operational and structural rules of inference to them,
– internalize the sequents so obtained within the validity predicate, interpreting
Val via principles that are modelled after the rules of inference for the classical
material conditional ⊃.
This process can be iterated: we apply again the operational, structural, and Val rules,
and so on ad infinitum. At some ordinal stage, this process reaches a fixed point,
which provides the desired interpretation of Val.
21For the theory of inductive definitions, see [22]. Non-reflexive approaches to paradoxes did not receive
an extensive attention in the literature: some works on the topic include [10, 11, 31, 32].
22For a strengthening of Meadows’ approach, see [35].
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Definition 4 Let S ⊆ ω, and define the set S+ as follows.
n ∈ S+ if :
(i) n ∈ S; or
(ii) n is  ⇒ s = t,, and N |= s = t ; or
(iii) n is , s = t ⇒ , and N |= s 	= t ; or
(iv) n is  ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,, and  ⇒ ϕ, ∈ S, and  ⇒ ψ, ∈ S; or
(v) n is , ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ , and , ϕ,ψ ⇒  ∈ S; or
(vi) n is  ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,, and  ⇒ ϕ,ψ, ∈ S; or
(vii) n is , ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ , and , ϕ ⇒  ∈ S, and ,ψ ⇒  ∈ S; or
(viii) n is  ⇒ ∀xϕ(x),, and for all t ∈ CterLV ,  ⇒ ϕ(t), ∈ S; or
(ix) n is ,∀xϕ(x) ⇒ , and for some t ∈ CterLV , , ϕ(t) ⇒  ∈ S; or
(x) n is  ⇒ Val(ϕ, ψ),, and , ϕ ⇒ ψ, ∈ S; or
(xi) n is ,Val(ϕ, ψ) ⇒ , and  ⇒ ϕ, ∈ S, and ,ψ ⇒  ∈ S.
CterLV is an elementary predicate representing the set of (codes of) closed terms
of LV . Let ζ(n, S) abbreviate items (i)-(xi). We can express this definition with an
operator  : P(ω) −→ P(ω) defined as (S) := {n ∈ ω | ζ(n, S)}. The operator
 is increasing and monotone, namely:
– for every S ⊆ ω, we have that S ⊆ (S);
– for every S1, S2 ⊆ ω, if S1 ⊆ S2, then (S1) ⊆ (S2).
For every S ⊆ ω, the set
S :=
⋃
α∈Ord
α(S)
is a fixed point of , since (S) = S . S is said to be the fixed point of 
generated by S. Let’s denote with I the fixed point of  generated by the empty
set:
I :=
⋃
α∈Ord
α(∅).
I is the least fixed point of : for every S ⊆ ω, I ⊆ S .
In the next section, we prove that I can be used to interpret LV -sequents in a
non-trivial way. We will then investigate the behaviour of the structural rules and of
the validity-theoretical principles in fixed points of .
4 Main Properties of the KV-Construction
We start by showing that there are consistent fixed points of . A fixed point S is
consistent if it does not contain the empty sequent ∅ ⇒ ∅. Consistency typically
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avoids triviality: if ∅ ⇒ ∅ is in a fixed point closed under weakening, then every
sequent is in that fixed point.23
Proposition 5 I is consistent.
Proof The proof is by induction on the stages Iα of the construction of I . The claim
is trivial for I0 and I
1
 . Assuming the claim for the stage I
α
 , one simply notices
that the stage Iα+1 is obtained from Iα by adding to it all sequents resulting from an
application of the clauses of Definition 4. It is then clear that, if ∅ ⇒ ∅ is not in Iα ,
no such clause can introduce it in Iα+1 . The limit case follows straightforwardly from
the successor cases.
We first notice that every stage Iα of I is closed under left and right weaken-
ing. By construction, any sequent  ⇒  in Iα is obtained by applying a series of
-clauses to sequents containing arithmetical truths or falsities, with arbitrary side
sentences. Therefore, in order to have ,′ ⇒ ,′ in Iα , we simply consider the
same succession of -clauses applied to starting sequents with ′ and ′ as extra
side sentences.
Lemma 4 (Weakening) For every ordinal α, if  ⇒  is in Iα , then for every
′,′ ⊆ SentLV , the sequent ,′ ⇒ ,′ is in Iα .
Also, since we are dealing with finite sets, left and right contraction hold for every
sequent in every stage of the construction of I .
Lemma 5 (Contraction) For every ordinal α, if , ϕ, ϕ ⇒  is in Iα , then , ϕ ⇒
 is in Iα . Similarly, if  ⇒ ψ,ψ, is in Iα , then  ⇒ ψ, is in Iα .
A crucial feature of our construction is that, at any stage, sequents are grounded
in at least one sentence in their antecedent or consequent.
Lemma 6 (Groundedness) For every ordinal α and every sequent  ⇒ , if  ⇒ 
is in Iα , then there is at least one sentence ϕ in  such that ϕ ⇒ ∅ is in Iα , or at
least one sentence ψ in  such that ∅ ⇒ ψ is in Iα .
Proof We reason by induction on the construction of I . The claim is trivial for I0 .
For I1 , the claim is also immediate since this set contains only sequents with atomic
arithmetical truths in the consequent or atomic arithmetical falsities in the antecedent.
We now assume the claim up to α, and prove it for α + 1. Let  ⇒  ∈ Iα+1 be
obtained by applying one -clause to sequents in Iα . We consider two cases.
23Consistency is typically defined as the absence of a contradiction, but our definition is equivalent to that.
We could introduce a connective ¬, interpreting ¬ϕ as Val(ϕ, 0 = 1), and show that the classical
rules for negation hold for the so-defined ¬ in I . Then, it would be easy to show that ∅ ⇒ ∅ /∈ I if and
only if there is no LV -sentence ϕ s.t. ∅ ⇒ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ∈ I . We note that the resulting negation is weaker
than classical negation, and indeed even weaker than intuitionistic negation (not al the ex falso sequents
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ⇒ ⊥ are in I , although the corresponding rule of inference is admissible in I ).
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We first deal with the -clause for introducing ∀ on the right: in this case  ⇒ 
has the form  ⇒ ′, ∀xϕ(x). The sequents in Iα from which  ⇒ ′, ∀xϕ(x) is
obtained, then, have the following form:
(11)  ⇒ ′, ϕ(t0), . . . ,  ⇒ ′, ϕ(tn), . . .
By induction hypothesis, for every  ⇒ ′, ϕ(ti) in (4), there is a ψi in  such that
ψi ⇒ ∅ belongs to Iα , or a χi in ′, ϕ(ti) such that ∅ ⇒ χi belongs to Iα . If, for
some i, ψi or χi are in  or ′, we are done. If there is no i such that ψi or χi are in
 or ′, the induction hypothesis gives us that ∅ ⇒ ϕ(ti) is in Iα for all i. Therefore,
an application of the -clause (ix) gives us that ∅ ⇒ ∀xϕ(x) is in Iα+1 , as desired.
If  ⇒  is obtained via the -clause (xi) of Definition 4, then it has the form
′,Val(ϕ0, ϕ1) ⇒  and Iα contains ′ ⇒ ϕ0, and ′, ϕ1 ⇒ . If the
induction hypothesis gives us sequents ψ ⇒ ∅ or ∅ ⇒ χ where ψ or χ are in ′ or
 respectively, we are done. In the only other case, the induction hypothesis gives us
that ϕ1 ⇒ ∅ and ∅ ⇒ ϕ0 are in Iα . By the -clause (xi) of Definition 4, then, we
get Val(ϕ0, ϕ1) ⇒ ∅ in Iα+1 .
To prove the closure of the stages of the construction of I under cut, we need the
following inversion lemma.
Lemma 7 (Inversion) For every ordinal α, the following holds:
(i) If  ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ, is in Iα , then  ⇒ ϕ, is in Iα and  ⇒ ψ, is in Iα .
(ii) If , ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒  is in Iα , then , ϕ,ψ ⇒  is in Iα .
(iii) If  ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ, is in Iα , then  ⇒ ϕ,ψ, is in Iα .
(iv) If , ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒  is in Iα , then , ϕ ⇒  is in Iα and ,ψ ⇒  is in Iα .
(v) If  ⇒ ∀xϕ(x), is in Iα , then for all t ∈ CterLV :  ⇒ ϕ(t), is in Iα .
(vi) If ,∀xϕ(x) ⇒  is in Iα , then for some t ∈ CterLV : , ϕ(t) ⇒  is in Iα .
(vii) If  ⇒ Val(ϕ, ψ), is in Iα , then , ϕ ⇒ ψ, is in Iα .
(viii) If ,Val(ϕ, ψ) ⇒  is in Iα , then  ⇒ ϕ, is in Iα and ,ψ ⇒  is
in Iα .
Proof We will only consider case (viii). Let α + 1 be the least ordinal such that
,Val(ϕ0, ϕ1) ⇒  is in Iα+1 . Then either (a) ,Val(ϕ0, ϕ1) ⇒  is
obtained by the -clause (xi) of Definition 4 or (b) it is obtained via a different -
clause. In case (a) , ϕ1 ⇒  and  ⇒ ϕ0, are in Iα and we are done. If (b), there
are several sub-cases to consider: we just deal with an application of the -clause
(viii), which yields a sequent of the form ,Val(ϕ0, ϕ1) ⇒ ′, ∀xϕ(x), with
 = ′, ∀xϕ(x). In this case ,Val(ϕ0, ϕ1) ⇒ ′, ϕ(ti) is in Iα for every i for
some formula ϕ(x). By induction hypothesis we obtain, in Iα , sequents of the form
() , ϕ1 ⇒ ′, ϕ(ti) (†)  ⇒ ϕ0,′, ϕ(ti)
for every i. By applying the -clause (viii) to all sequents of the form () and (†)
respectively, we obtain that , ϕ1 ⇒ ′, ∀xϕ(x) and  ⇒ ϕ0,′, ∀xϕ(x) are in
Iα+1 , as desired.
Finally, we show that every stage of the construction of I is closed under cut.
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Proposition 6 (Closure under cut) For every α, if  ⇒ ,ϕ and ϕ,  ⇒  are in
Iα , then also  ⇒  is in Iα .
Proof The proof is by induction. The case for I0 is trivial. The case for I
1
 is also
immediately obtained since, for  ⇒ ,ϕ and ϕ,  ⇒  to be in I1 ,  or  have
to contain at least one atomic arithmetical falsity or truth respectively.
Let us suppose that, for α > 0,  ⇒ ,ϕ and ϕ,  ⇒  are in Iα+1 . There are
three main cases to be considered: (a) in the first,  ⇒ ,ϕ and ϕ,  ⇒  are
obtained by means of a -clause that introduces ϕ; (b) in the second, only one of
 ⇒ ,ϕ and ϕ,  ⇒  is obtained via a -clause that introduces ϕ; (c) in the
third, neither  ⇒ ,ϕ nor ϕ,  ⇒  is obtained via a -clause that introduces ϕ.
(a) We consider the case in which ϕ is of the form Val(ϕ0, ϕ1). Therefore the
sequents
(I) , ϕ0 ⇒ ϕ1, (II)  ⇒ ϕ0, (III) , ϕ1 ⇒ 
are in Iα . By the weakening lemma applied to (II), also  ⇒ ϕ0, ϕ1, is in Iα .
By induction hypotesis, since (I) is in Iα , also  ⇒ ϕ1, is in Iα . Therefore,
since (III) is also in Iα ,  ⇒  will be in Iα ⊆ Iα+1 as well, as desired.
(b) We only consider the case in which ϕ is Val(ϕ0, ϕ1). We assume, more-
over, that  ⇒ ,Val(ϕ0, ϕ1) is obtained via the -clause (viii) from
sequents in Iα of the form
(IV)  ⇒ ′, ϕ(ti),Val(ϕ0, ϕ1)
for all i ∈ ω, and that Val(ϕ0, ϕ1),  ⇒  is obtained via the -clause
(xi) from  ⇒ ϕ0, and , ϕ1 ⇒  in Iα . On the one hand, by the inversion
lemma applied to all sequents of the form (IV), we obtain that all sequents
of the form , ϕ0 ⇒ ′, ϕ(ti), ϕ1 are in Iα . By the weakening lemma, since
 = ′, ∀xϕ(x),
(V) , ϕ0 ⇒ ,ϕ(ti), ϕ1
is in Iα for all i ∈ ω. On the other, from the fact that  ⇒ ϕ0, and , ϕ1 ⇒ 
are in Iα , the weakening lemma gives us
(VI)  ⇒ ϕ(ti), ϕ0, ϕ1, (VII) , ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ(ti),
in Iα . By induction hypotesis, since for all i ∈ ω (V) and (VI) are in Iα , also
 ⇒ ϕ(ti), ϕ1, is in Iα for all i ∈ ω. Therefore, since for all i ∈ ω (VII)
is also in Iα ,  ⇒ ϕ(ti), will be in Iα for all i ∈ ω. An application of the
-clause (viii) gives us the desired result.
(c) We consider the case in which  ⇒ ,ϕ and ϕ,  ⇒  are obtained by
application of the -clause (viii) to sequents in Iα of the form
(VIII)  ⇒ ′, ϕ0(ti), ϕ (IX) ϕ,  ⇒ ′′, ϕ1(ti)
for all i ∈ ω. By the groundedness lemma applied to all sequents of the form
(VIII), we obtain, for each i ∈ ω, that either there is a sequent ψi ⇒ ∅ is in Iα
for ψi ∈ , or there is a sequent ∅ ⇒ χi in Iα with χi ∈ ′, ϕ0(ti), ϕ. In the
former case, we are done by the weakening lemma; in the latter case, if χi ∈ ′
we are also done by weakening, otherwise we reason as follows. If χi is ϕ0(ti)
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for all i, an application of the -clause (viii) gives us that ∅ ⇒ ∀xϕ0(x) is
in Iα+1 , therefore the claim follows by the weakening lemma. If χi is ϕ for
some i, we apply the groundedness lemma to all sequents of the form (IX).
By the consistency of I , the induction hypothesis cannot give us ϕ ⇒ ∅ in
Iα . In all other possible outcomes of the groundedness lemma applied to all
sequents of the form (IX), we reason as we did in the corresponding cases
of (VIII).
Reflexivity is the only structural rule that does not hold unrestrictedly in I (the
proof is a slight variant of the V-Curry derivation sketched in the introduction).
Lemma 8 I cannot contain all the instances of
(Ref) ϕ ⇒ ϕ
for ϕ an arbitrary LV -sentence.
Lemma 8 shows also that dropping reflexivity is ‘best possible’: we have a single
structural rule that cannot be consistently accepted.24 I , however, features a weaker
form of reflexivity, which follows immediately from the weakening lemma. For every
ϕ ∈ LV , we can always find  and  ⊆ SentLV such that , ϕ ⇒ ϕ, ∈ I , where
 and  can be taken to be disjoint.
4.1 Naı¨ve Validity in I
Several principles for naı¨ve validity (including the (Val-Schema)+ formulated and
discussed in [9]) are recovered in I , in the sense made precise by the following
result.
Lemma 9 For every ϕ,ψ ∈ LV , and every 0, 1,0,1 ⊆ SentLV :
(VDm) if 0 ⇒ ϕ,0 is in I and 1 ⇒ Val(ϕ, ψ),1 is in I,
then 0, 1 ⇒ ψ,0,1 is in I.
(Val-Schema)+ , ϕ⇒ψ, is in I if and only if ⇒Val(ϕ, ψ), is in I.
Since (Val-Schema)+ holds in I , it is clear that (VP) and (Val-Schema) are
recovered in I as well.
(VDm) is not to be understood as a ‘weaker version’ of (VD), since there are the-
ories that validate (VD) but for which (VDm) is too strong and yields triviality. The
non-transitive approach of Ripley [29] and Cobreros et al. [6] is a case in point:
adapting the theory developed there to the validity predicate, we see that (VD) holds,
while an unrestricted acceptance of (VDm) would trivialize the theory. Essentially,
24[32] has recently remarked that a similar restriction of reflexivity in the context of rules for naı¨ve
comprehension can avoid paradoxes and, at the same time, make both cut and contraction admissible.
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this is because (VDm) incorporates a form of cut, which is clearly inadmissible in a
non-transitive approach.25
(VD) is the only validity-theoretical principle that does not hold unrestrictedly in
I . In fact, if I contained all instances of (VD), then it would also contain its instance
ν,Val(ν, ⊥) ⇒ ⊥
where ν is the V-Curry sentence Val(ν, ⊥). The derivation of the V-Curry para-
dox (outlined in the introduction) would then give us the sequent ∅ ⇒ ∅ in I ,
against the consistency of I .
In Section 3.1 we suggested that a uniform way to avoid V-Curry-driven trivial-
ity consists in restricting our acceptance of initial sequents, avoiding the acceptance
of Val-sentences that express inferences that we cannot control. Rules of inference,
on the other hand, are safe, since the construction of I operates a selection over the
sequents that are accepted in the first place. This view sits naturally with a restriction
of (Ref) and (VD) (the only schematic inferences amongst the structural rules and the
validity-theoretical principles) and an unrestricted acceptance of weakening, contrac-
tion, cut, (VP), (VDm), and (Val-Schema)+. The results 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9, establish
that I realizes the solution to the paradoxes described in Section 3.
It is easy to turn I into a proper model of the language LV , as it is standardly
done with Kripke fixed points. Let the extension of the validity predicate generated
by I , in symbols E , be the set of those pairs of LV -sentences 〈ϕ,ψ〉 such that
∅ ⇒ Val(ϕ, ψ) is in I , and the anti-extension of the validity predicate gen-
erated by I , in symbols A , be the set of pairs of LV -sentences 〈ϕ,ψ〉 such that
Val(ϕ, ψ) ⇒ ∅ is in I . The model of LV naturally associated with I , thus,
is (N,E,A), and its evaluation clauses can be read off Definition 4. In particu-
lar, (N,E,A) can be associated with a three-valued semantics, say with values
{0, 1/2, 1}, where the logical vocabulary is interpreted as in strong Kleene semantics
(with Val being treated as the strong Kleene conditional), and where  ⇒  has a
tolerant-strict reading, that is whenever every ϕ ∈  has value 1/2 or 1, then there is
a ψ ∈  with value 1.26
We conclude this subsection by noticing that there are close relations between
I and the least fixed point of Kripke’s construction for truth (strong Kleene ver-
sion) from [16]. This can be achieved by defining ¬ϕ and T(ϕ), respectively, as
Val(ϕ, 0 = 1) and Val(0 = 0, ϕ), and by constructing the least Kripke fixed
25The choice between (VD) and (VDm) reflects an ongoing debate in the truth-theoretical literature (espe-
cially concerning substructural theories of truth) on the ‘correct’ form of modus ponens (see [42] and [30]).
Two of the main contenders are analogous to (VD) and (VDm):
ϕ, ϕ → ψ  ψ and from   ϕ and   ϕ → ψ infer ,  ψ.
26We are grateful to Paul Egre´, Francesco Paoli, and Robert van Rooij for suggesting this point to us.
Tolerant-strict consequence is also employed in [20].
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point, in the usual way, for the language LV . For every sentence ϕ ∈ LV we will
have that:
if ϕ is in the extension of T in the least Kripke’s fixed point, then ∅⇒ϕ is in I;
if ϕ is in the anti-extension of T in the least Kripke’s fixed point, then ϕ⇒∅ is in I.
(12)
(12) indicates that Kripke’s least fixed point for truth constitutes a proper fragment
of I . Clearly, the other direction of (12) does not hold.
4.2 Non-Minimal Fixed Points and Extensions
Lemma 5 shows that every fixed point of  is closed under contraction. How-
ever, this is not so for weakening. The fixed point {(∅ ⇒ μ)} , where μ is
the sentence Val(μ, μ), for example, is not closed under weakening (μ is the
validity-theoretical analogue of the truth-teller). This shortcoming, however, can be
easily fixed. Let + be the monotone operator that results by adding to items (i)-(xi)
of Definition 4 the following positive elementary clause as a further disjunct:
(xii) n is (, ′ ⇒ ′,), and ( ⇒ ) ∈ S.
Let’s adapt the notation adopted for  to +. The following result is immediate
(the first item follows from Lemma 4 and the proof of Proposition 6, and the second
by an induction on the build-up of S+).
Lemma 10
– I = I+ .
– For every S ⊆ ω, S is consistent if and only if S+ is consistent.
The properties of I transfer to I+ , and the consistency of a fixed point S transfers
to the fixed point of + generated by the same set S.27 The operator +, however,
guarantees closure under weakening, contraction, and cut.28
Observation 2 For every S ⊆ ω, every ϕ ∈ LV , and every , ⊆ SentLV :
(L-Wkn) If ⇒ is in S+, then , ϕ ⇒  ∈ S+ .
(R-Wkn) If ⇒ is in S+, then  ⇒ ϕ, is in S+ .
(L-Ctr) If , ϕ, ϕ ⇒  is in S+, then , ϕ ⇒  is in S+ .
(R-Ctr) If ⇒ϕ, ϕ, is in S+, then  ⇒ ϕ, is in S+ .
(Cut) If ⇒ϕ, is in S+ and , ϕ ⇒  is in S+, then  ⇒  is in S+ .
27We did not use + in the first place in order to simplify the proofs of the properties of I : this has no
practical effects, however, since I and I+ are identical.
28This result improves on the structural rules recovered by Meadows in [20].
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5 From Logical to Grounded Consequence
In this paper, we investigated different combinations and modifications of the princi-
ples (VP) and (VD), and the corresponding notions of consequence. Starting with a
restriction of (VP) corresponding to the notion of logical consequence, we explored
ways of keeping the full (VP), thereby restricting (VD), carving out a notion of self-
applicable consequence grounded in truths and falsities of the base theory. The key
findings of the paper are summarized in Table 1.
The rules (VP) and (VD) support a strict reading of  as logical derivability, and
therefore of Val as the class of the logically valid inferences. On this approach, (VP),
namely (VP1) in the formalism of Section 2, is restricted to purely logical inferences,
while the full (VD) – (VD1) in Section 2 – can be consistently kept: from this point
of view, we can naturally read (VD) as preservation of truth in logically valid argu-
ments. A sub-theory of our theory of logical validity is the theory given by (VD) and
a suitable version of (VP): this theory meets the criterion (suggested by Field in [9])
of giving the same reading to both the meta-theoretic notion expressed by  and to
the predicate Val. The theory of logical validity is therefore simple and well-behaved:
it’s then natural to study in more depth the corresponding notion of object-linguistic
validity by comparing it to the inferential resources of the underlying base theory.
Corollary 1 tells us that logical validity does not have any impact on the underly-
ing syntactic structure: for any theory extending a very weak arithmetical system,
(VD) and the restricted version of (VP) do not enable us to prove new syntactic or
arithmetical facts. This extends to further principles for logical consequence, like
internalized modus ponens, as shown in Corollary 3. These results seem to suggest
that ‘deflationary’ approaches to logical consequence, such as Shapiro’s [34], may
endorse conservativity requirements for logical validity. This is not to say, however,
that the predicate of logical consequence does not play an indispensable expressive
role: although the theory of logical validity is uniformly locally interpretable in the
base theory, our results do not show that it is relatively interpretable in the object
theory and therefore, arguably, expressively reducible to it.
As we have seen, the consistency of the theory of logical validity follows from a
restriction of (VP) to purely logical derivations: consistency, however, is preserved
even if we internalize purely arithmetical derivations. This led us, following [9], to
Table 1 Key Findings
Consequence Key Finding
Logical (i) Conservativity for all B ⊇ EA
(ii) Local L -embeddability for all B ⊇ EA
Arithmetical Analysis of Field’s hierarchy via local reflection principles
Grounded (i) Consistency of (VP), (VDm), (Val-Schema)+
(ii) Kripke-style theory for Val: development of 
(iii) Make sense of Val-principles via I and grounded validity
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investigate a hierarchy of arithmetical consequence predicates. We have shown that
every stage in this hierarchy corresponds to a stage of a parallel hierarchy of local
reflection principles; as a consequence, the hierarchical notion of validity can be read
as iterated arithmetical provability.
The hierarchical approach to consequence suffers from several well-known prob-
lems: in particular, there seem to be notions of ‘following from’ that cannot be
accounted for in the stratified picture, such as implication. Transcending the hier-
archy calls for an unrestricted (VP). We have achieved this via a Kripke-style
construction, the KV-construction, in which the unrestricted (VP) is balanced by a
rule form of (VD). The least fixed point of the KV-construction, I , embodies a notion
that, following Kripke’s theory of truth, we might call grounded validity, i.e. validity
grounded in truths and falsities of the base language, in our case arithmetical truths
and falsities.29
The main intuition behind grounded validity is that first we have inferences involv-
ing non-semantic facts, which we can then combine and iterate to express more
complex inferences, crucially including nested occurrences of the consequence rela-
tion. At the fixed point I , the process of generating more and more acceptable
inferences reaches a halt: the set I realizes in full the idea of iterating arbitrarily the
grounded consequences, and of expressing them in the object-language. To see this,
let F be the set of LV -sentences such that ϕ is in F if and only if ∅ ⇒ ϕ is in I .
It is immediate to see that, thanks to the fixed-point property of I , for all sentences
ϕ,ψ we have that:
(13) Val(ϕ, ψ) ∈ F if and only if Val(∅, Val(ϕ, ψ)) ∈ F.
(13) follows immediately by Lemma 9, that shows that (Val-Schema)+ holds unre-
strictedly in I . In his [9], Field rejects (Val-Schema)+ on the grounds of an example
that, informally, reads thus:
It follows from ‘snow is white’ that
(14) it follows from ‘grass is green’ that ‘snow is white’.
If ‘follows from’ is intended as logical consequence, (14) clearly does not hold. How-
ever, (14), and more generally (Val-Schema)+, cease to be troubling if we adopt the
grounded consequence reading: since snow is white, this truth about the non-semantic
vocabulary grounds and justifies the consequence expressed in (14).30
Desirable features such as that expressed in (13) come at a cost: we cannot con-
sistently accept all sequents of the form ϕ ⇒ ϕ in I . As a consequence, not all
sentences of the form Val(ϕ, ϕ) are in F . However, this restriction is not so
implausible in the context of a grounded consequence relation. Some sequents of the
form ϕ ⇒ ϕ, in fact, are to be rejected because they are ungrounded. A paradigmatic
29See [16], p. 694 and p. 701. For an analysis of Kripkean groundedness, see [40]. For arguments for
Kripkean grounded truth, see [17, 19], and [4].
30Grounded validity is clearly distinct from analytical validity, i.e. validity based on analytical truths and
falsities. In fact, it is possible to start our construction from non-analytic claims, e.g. about snow being
white and grass being green. Thanks to Andreas Fjellstad for bringing this point to our attention.
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case of failure of (Ref) involves the V-Curry sentence itself: we do not have ν ⇒ ν
in I . In other words, we do not accept that
from the fact that (from this sentence it follows that 0 = 1),
(15)
it follows that (from this sentence it follows that 0 = 1).
If we only accept grounded Val-sentences, we want to unpack the ‘it follows’ used in
(15), to see from where it derives. Given the ungrounded nature of ν, such unpacking
does not lead us to non-semantic inferences, but to an endless, circular regress. Cases
such as (15) are the only kind of sequents of the form ϕ ⇒ ϕ that are not in I , which
makes the restriction of reflexivity less drastic.31 Similarly, ungrounded instances of
(VD) are not in I , and this restriction is justified as in the case of reflexivity.
5.1 Future Work
We conclude by sketching some directions for further work. In the context of logical
validity, the main open problem is the question of the global interpretability and, most
importantly, of the L -embedding of the theory of logical validity in the base theory.
As for grounded consequence, the construction described by I can be turned into
an axiomatic theory. It would then be natural to study the relationships between this
theory and the class of models extending (N,E,A). Finally, it would be interesting
to relate irreflexive validity with paracomplete theories of truth and validity.32
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